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Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis

'NATO Science Series D'. Auflage 1994. Book. Sprache: Englisch.
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JEAN-FRANQOIS MERTENS This book presents a systematic exposition of the use of game theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis. Clearly the first such use was by Arrow and Debreu, with the "birth" of general equi­ librium theory itself, i... weiterlesen
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Produktdetails
Titel: Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis

ISBN: 0792330110
EAN: 9780792330110
'NATO Science Series D'.
Auflage 1994.
Book.
Sprache: Englisch.
Herausgegeben von J. F. Mertens, S. Sorin
Springer Netherlands

31. Juli 1994 - gebunden - 276 Seiten

Beschreibung

JEAN-FRANQOIS MERTENS This book presents a systematic exposition of the use of game theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis. Clearly the first such use was by Arrow and Debreu, with the "birth" of general equi­ librium theory itself, in using Nash's existence theorem (or a generalization) to prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium. But this use appeared possibly to be merely tech­ nical, borrowing some tools for proving a theorem. This book stresses the later contributions, were game theoretic concepts were used as such, to explain various aspects of the general equilibrium model. But clearly, each of those later approaches also provides per sea game theoretic proof of the existence of competitive equilibrium. Part A deals with the first such approach: the equality between the set of competitive equilibria of a perfectly competitive (i.e., every trader has negligible market power) economy and the core of the corresponding cooperative game.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

List of Figures. List of Authors. Introduction; J.-F. Mertens. A: The Core and the Bargaining Set. I. General Equilibrium and Cooperative Games: Basic Results; E. Allen, S. Sorin. II. Core Convergence in Perfectly Competitive Economies; R.M. Anderson. III. Economies with Atoms; J.-F. Mertens. IV. Bargaining Sets; R. Vohra. B: The Value. V. The Shapley Value; R.J. Aumann. VI. Value of Games with a Continuum of Players; A. Neyman. VII. The TU Value: the Non-Differentiable Case; J.-F. Mertens. Addendum: The Shapley value of a perfectly competitive market may not exist; F. Lefèvre. VIII. The Harsanyi Value; S. Hart. IX. Value Equivalence Theorems: the TU and NTU Cases; S. Hart. X. Economic Applications of the Shapley Value; R.J. Aumann. C: The Cooperative Approach to Large Markets and Games. XI. An Axiomatic Approach to the Equivalence Phenomenon; P. Dubey, A. Neyman. XII. Large Games and Economies with Effective Small Groups; M.H. Wooders. D: The Non-Cooperative Approach. XIII. Strategic Market Games: a Survey of Some Results; P. Dubey. XIV. From Nash to Walras Equilibrium; E. Allen, H. Polemarchakis. XV. Correlated and Communication Equilibria; J.-F. Mertens. XVI. Notes on Correlated Equilibrium and Sunspot Equilibrium; J. Peck. XVII. Implementation with Plain Conversation; S. Sorin.
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