This book focuses on the antitrust process and how that process affects the efficiency of antitrust law enforcement. The contributors share a wide range of experiences in the antitrust process, including academia, the legal environment, and both private and public sectors. The book deals first with merger activities, followed by non-merger enforcement initiatives and concludes with an examination of the future role of antitrust.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
1 Introduction: The Economics of the Antitrust Process. - 2 Overenforcement in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Second Request Process. - 3 The Merger Guidelines As Applied. - 4 Simulation as an Alternative to Structural Merger Policy in Differentiated Products Industries. - 5 The Efficiencies Defense in Merger Cases. - 6 Buyers, Market Power, and Market Definition. - 7 Merger Enforcement at the Reagan/Bush FTC. - 8 Winners and Losers in the Settlement of Merger Litigation. - 9 Efficiency Lost? : The Microsoft Consent Decree. - 10 Predatory Pricing in the Retail Trade: The Wal-Mart Case. - 11 Guilt by Association: An Analysis of Nonprice Horizontal Restraint Enforcement. - 12 Antitrust, Economics, and Reality .
