Why do some countries choose to end wars short of total victory while others fight on, sometimes in the face of appalling odds? How Wars End argues that two central factors shape war-termination decision making: information about the balance of power and the resolve of one's enemy, and fears that the other side's commitment to abide by a war-ending peace settlement may not be credible.
Dan Reiter explains how information about combat outcomes and other factors may persuade a warring nation to demand more or less in peace negotiations, and why a country might refuse to negotiate limited terms and instead tenaciously pursue absolute victory if it fears that its enemy might renege on a peace deal. He fully lays out the theory and then tests it on more than twenty cases of war-termination behavior, including decisions during the American Civil War, the two world wars, and the Korean War. Reiter helps solve some of the most enduring puzzles in military history, such as why Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, why Germany in 1918 renewed its attack in the West after securing peace with Russia in the East, and why Britain refused to seek peace terms with Germany after France fell in 1940.
How Wars End concludes with a timely discussion of twentieth-century American foreign policy, framing the Bush Doctrine's emphasis on preventive war in the context of the theory.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
List of Illustrations and Tables xi
Acknowledgments xiii
CHAPTER ONE: Ending Wars 1
CHAPTER TWO: Bargaining, Information, and Ending Wars 8
CHAPTER THREE: Credible Commitments and War Termination 22
CHAPTER FOUR: Conducting Empirical Tests 51
CHAPTER FIVE: The Korean War 63
CHAPTER SIX: The Allies, 1940-42 92
CHAPTER SEVEN: The Logic of War 121
Finland and the USSR, 1939-44
CHAPTER EIGHT: The American Civil War 140
CHAPTER NINE: Germany, 1917-18 165
CHAPTER TEN: Japan, 1944-45 186
CHAPTER ELEVEN: Conclusions 211
Notes 231
Bibliography 267
Index 289
