Modern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies

This book provides a historical study of the theory and praxis of modern insurgencies and counterinsurgencies (COIN).

Modern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: A Global History shows that the insurgents can wage a variety of conflicts: at times conventional war which lies at the high end of their spectrum, and terrorism which is located at the lowest end of their scale. When insurgencies reach a certain critical threshold, the insurgents shift their strategy from guerrilla (irregular) war to conventional (regular) war, and at that point the level of conflict escalates to the level of civil war. When the insurgents face intense state repression, they revert to terrorist activities. When the insurgents wage guerrilla war, they can be called guerrillas. The variety of wars conducted by the insurgents is termed as unconventional war. This volume demonstrates that the insurgents in the modern world had been motivated by a trinity: greed, grievances and ideology. Kaushik Roy traces the origin of modern insurgencies and COIN from the sixteenth century by focusing on regions outside Western Eurasia. He also touches on the twin interrelated phenomena of modern insurgencies and COIN metastasising into something new at the beginning of the Information Revolution at the end of the twentieth century.

This volume will be of interest to researchers and research students of history, British Empire, imperial studies, Asian studies, security studies, strategic studies, and war and conflict studies.

0. Introduction, 1. From Protomodern Insurgencies to Modern Insurgencies and COIN, 2. Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies in the European Empires, 3. American Imperialism and Armed Rebels, 4. Modern Insurgencies and COIN in the Asian Empires, 5. Neo-Imperialism, Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies, 6. Nation States, Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies in Asia, 7. Insurgent Tribes and COIN in Africa, 8. Nation States, Criminals and Insurgents of Latin America, 9. Postmodern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies, 10. Conclusion