Over a longer period than I sometimes care to contemplate I have worked on possible-worlds semantics. The earliest work was in modal logic, to which I keep returning, but a sabbatical in 1970 took me to UCLA, there to discover the work of Richard Montague in applying possible-worlds semantics to natural lan guage. My own version of this appeared in Cresswell (1973) and was followed up in a number of articles, most of which were collected in Cresswell (1985b). A central problem for possible worlds semantics is how to accommodate propositional attitudes. This problem was addressed in Cresswell (1985a), and the three books mentioned so far represent a reasonably complete picture of my positive views on formal semantics. I have regarded the presentation of a positive view as more important than the criticism of alternatives, although the works referred to do contain many passages in which I have tried to defend my own views against those of others. But such criticism is important in that a crucial element in establishing the content of a theory is that we be able to evaluate it in relation to its com petitors. It is for that reason that I have collected in this volume a number of articles in which I attempt to defend the positive semantical picture I favour against objections and competing theories.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
I Possible Worlds: Introduction. - 1 Possible Worlds. - 2 Semantic Competence. - 3 Semantics and Logic. - 4 Physical Theories and Possible Worlds. - II Situations and Attitudes: Introduction. - 5 The World Situation (It s a small world after all). - 6 Quotational Theories of Propositional Attitudes. - 7 More about Inscriptionalism. - III Quantification and Reference: Introduction. - 8 Identity and Intensional Objects. - 9 The Greek-Turkish Imbroglio (Do we need game-theoretical semantics?). - 10 Some Recent Theories of Anaphora.