This volume argues that, when coming up with theories about what the world is like, philosophers should, whenever possible, make use of the same methodology that is deployed by scientists. Nina Emery's investigation illuminates the complex relationship between philosophy and the sciences, showing how philosophers and scientists alike would benefit from a greater understanding of the connections between the two fields.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1. From Content Naturalism to Methodological Naturalism
- 2. Content Naturalism as the Default View
- 3. Why Methodological Naturalism Impacts Metaphysical Theorizing
- 4. Case Study: Pattern Explanation and the Governing Conception of Laws
- 5. Case Study: Mooreanism and Nihilism about Composition
- 6. Case Study: Excess Structure
- 7. Context Dependence in Scientific Methodology
- 8. Metaphysics Unmoored?
- Conclusion
- References
- Index
