This book explains why the United States' local allies are often as much of an obstacle to success in counterinsurgency as the insurgents themselves.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
1. A recurring obstacle; 2. Allies in counterinsurgency; 3. Inter-alliance influence; 4. America's boy? The Philippines, 1947-53: 4.1 Crafting a strategy, 1947-50; 4.2 Implementing military and economic reform, 1950-1; 4.3 The political effort, 19513; 5. The puppet that pulled its own strings? Vietnam, 1957-63: 5.1 The Eisenhower years, 1957-60; 5.2 The origins of the Kennedy commitment, 1961; 5.3 The illusion of progress and the end of diem; 6. The lesser of two evils? El Salvador, 1979-92: 6.1 The Carter years, 1979-80; 6.2 The Reagan initiative, 1981-4; 6.3 Return to stalemate, 1985-92; 7. Conclusion.
