Bounded Rationality and Industrial Organization

Name: Bounded Rationality and Industrial Organization
Brand: Oxford University Press
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Grounded in key observations in consumer psychology, Bounded Rationality and Industrial Organization develops non-standard models of "boundedly rational" consumer behavior and embeds them into familiar models of markets.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1 Introduction

1.1 Bibliographic Notes

I Anticipating Future Preferences

2 Dynamically Inconsistent Preferences I: Unconstrained Contracting

2.1 The Multi-Selves Model

2.1.1 Naivety

2.2 Monopoly Pricing

2.2.1 Optimal Price Schemes for Sophisticated Consumers

2.2.2 Optimal Price Schemes for Naive Consumers

2.2.3 Screening the Consumer's Type

2.3 Competitive Pricing

2.4 Welfare Analysis

2.5 Educating Naive Consumers

2.6 The Interpretation of Naivety

2.7 Two Applications

2.8 Other Topics

2.8.1 The (?, ?) Model

2.8.2 Preference Heterogeneity

2.9 Summary

2.10 Bibliographic Notes

3 Dynamically Inconsistent Preferences II: Constrained Contracting

3.1 Two-Part Tariffs

3.1.1 Departure from Marginal-Cost Pricing

3.1.2 Welfare Analysis

3.2 Destabilization of Commitment Devices: Renegotiation and Spot Market

Competition

3.3 Self-Control

3.3.1 Implications for Monopoly Pricing

3.3.2 Do Self-Control Costs Hamper Competition?

3.4 Summary

3.5 Bibliographic Notes

4 Dynamically Inconsistent Preferences III: Partial Naivety

4.1 Magnitude Naivety

4.1.1 Monopoly Pricing

4.1.2 Are More Sophisticated Consumers Always Better Off?

4.2 Frequency Naivety

4.2.1 First-Best Monopoly Pricing

4.2.2 Second-Best Monopoly Pricing

4.2.3 Does Competition Curb Exploitation?

4.3 Summary

4.4 Bibliographic Notes

5 Biased Beliefs without Dynamic Inconsistency

5.1 Monopoly Pricing with Over-Optimistic Consumers

5.1.1 Comparison with Related Models

5.2 Overconfidence: Three-Part Tariffs

5.3 Unforeseen Contingencies: Add-On Pricing

5.4 A Summary Exercise: Insurance Markets with Biased Consumers

5.4.1 Equilibrium Analysis when Subjective Beliefs are Observable

5.4.2 Equilibrium Analysis when Subjective Beliefs are Private Information

5.5 Summary

5.6 Bibliographic notes

A Appendix to Part I: A Decision-Theoretic Perspective

A.1 The Multi-Selves Model

A.2 Self-Control Preferences

A.3 The Relation between Self-Control Preferences and the Multi-Selves Model

A.4 Other Classes of Temptation-Driven Preferences

A.5 Bibliographic Notes

II Responding to Market Complexity

6 Sampling-Based Reasoning: Price Competition and Product Differentiation

6.1 A Sampling-Based Choice Procedure

6.2 Price Competition and Technology Adoption

6.2.1 Nash Equilibrium

6.2.2 Welfare Analysis

6.3 Spurious Product Differentiation

6.3.1 Nash Equilibrium

6.3.2 Product Complexity as a Differentiation Device

6.4 Can the Market Educate Consumers?

6.5 Summary

6.6 Bibliographic Notes

7 Sampling-Based Reasoning: Obfuscation

7.1 A Model of Competitive Obfuscation

7.1.1 Nash Equilibrium

7.1.2 Welfare Analysis

7.2 Production Inefficiencies

7.3 Multi-Dimensional Prices

7.4 A Market Intervention: Introducing \Simple" Options

7.5 Summary

7.6 Bibliographic Notes

8 Coarse Reasoning

8.1 A Modeling Framework

8.2 Complex Price Patterns as a Discrimination Device

8.2.1 "DeBruijn" Price Sequences

8.2.2 Conditions for Profitability of Complex Price Patterns

8.3 Limited Understanding of Adverse Selection

8.3.1 A Buyer-Seller Example

8.3.2 A Benchmark: A Bayesian-Rational Buyer

8.3.3 A \Coarse" Buyer

8.3.4 Action-Dependent Feedback

8.4 Summary

8.5 Bibliographic Notes

III Reference Dependence

9 Loss Aversion

9.1 Expected Price as a Reference Point: Monopoly Pricing

9.1.1 Reduced Price Variability

9.1.2 Impact on Expected Prices

9.2 Price Uniformity in a Duopoly Setting: \Kinked" Demand

9.3 Expected Consumption as a Reference Point: An \Attachment Effect"

9.3.1 Personal Equilibrium

9.3.2 Price Randomization

9.4 Discussion

9.4.1 Actual Prices as Reference Points

9.4.2 Pleasant Surprises

9.5 Summary

9.6 Bibliographic Notes

10 Inertia I: Price Competition

10.1 Price Competition under Consumer Inertia

10.2 Price-Frame Competition

10.2.1 Nash Equilibrium

10.2.2 Equilibrium Properties

10.2.3 Two Market Interventions

10.3 Consumer Switching

10.4 Asymmetric Default Assignment

10.5 A Few General Remarks

10.5.1 More than Two Frames

10.5.2 Revealed Preferences

10.6 Summary

10.7 Bibliographic Notes

11 Inertia II: Costly Marketing 261

11.1 A Model of Competitive Marketing

11.2 Nash Equilibrium

11.3 The Effective Marketing Property

11.4 Discussion

11.5 Summary

11.6 Bibliographic Notes

IV Discussion

12 Recurring Themes

12.1 Complex Pricing Strategies

12.2 Spurious Variety

12.3 Market Transactions as a Form of Speculative Trade

12.4 How Effective are Competition and Consumer Protection Policies?

12.5 Externalities between Rational and Boundedly Rational Consumers

12.6 Conclusion

13 But Can't we Get the Same Thing with a Standard Model?

13.1 Rationalization via Modified Information

13.2 Rationalization via Modified Preferences

13.3 Rationalization via Endogenization

13.4 Discussion

13.5 Epilogue

13.6 Bibliographic Notes

Bibliography

Index

Produktdetails

Erscheinungsdatum

01. Februar 2014

Sprache

englisch

Seitenanzahl

240

Autor/Autorin

Ran Spiegler, Steven Christian Currall

Verlag/Hersteller

Oxford University Press

Produktart

kartoniert

Gewicht

371 g

Größe (L/B/H)

234/156/13 mm

ISBN

9780199334261

Entdecken Sie mehr

Organisationstheorie und -verhalten

Organisationstheorie und -verhalten

Portrait

Ran Spiegler

Professor of Economics at Tel Aviv University and University College London

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