Intentionality Deconstructed argues for the view that no concrete entity - mental, linguistic, or any other - can possess intentional content. Nothing can be about anything. The concept of intentionality is flawed, and so content ascriptions cannot be "absolutely" true or false - they lack truth conditions.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
- Preface
- 1: Introducing Intentionality
- 2: How to Settle Issues of Intentionality, and a Tentative Argument for Intentional Anti-Realism
- 3: Against Phenomenal Intentionality as Intrinsic Reductive Intentionality
- 4: Against Naturalistic Reductions of Intentionality
- 5: Intentional Anti-Realism I
- 6: Intentional anti-realism II: Objections and Further Developments
- References