Jack Lyons addresses two central questions in epistemology: which beliefs are epistemologically basic (i.e. noninferentially justified) and where does perception end and inferential cognition begin.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
- Abbreviations
- Chapter 1: External Object Foundationalism
- 1.1The Problem of the External World
- 1.2 Metaphysical and Epistemological Direct Realisms
- 1.3 Basic Beliefs
- Chapter 2: Doxastic and Nondoxastic Theories
- 2.1 Evidential and Nonevidential Justifiers
- 2.2 The Supervenience Argument
- 2.3 Doxasticism and Nondoxasticism
- 2.4 Doxastic Theories
- Chapter 3: Experientialist Theories: 3.1 Sensation and Perception
- 3.2 Sensations as Grounds
- 3.2.1 Sensationless Perception
- 3.2.2 The Sensation/perception Gap and Collateral Information
- 3.2.3 Problems Concerning Basing
- 3.2.4 SE and the Content of Sensations
- 3.3 Percepts as Grounds
- 3.3.1 In Search of the Percept
- 3.3.2 Percepts and Beliefs
- 3.3.3 The Zombies Return
- 3.4 The Belief Principle
- 3.5 Experiential States as Nonevidential Justifiers
- 3.6 Intuitive Resistance
- 3.7 Recapitulation
- Chapter 4: Perceptual Systems and Perceptual Beliefs
- 4.1 Perceptual Systems
- 4.1.1 Cognitive Systems/Modules
- 4.1.2 Perceptual Modules
- 4.2 The Plausibility of the Perceptual System Theory
- 4.2.1 The "Grain Size" of Perceptual Beliefs
- 4.2.2 Perception and Ungrounded Justified Belief
- 4.2.3 Perceptual Learning and Nonexperiential 'Looks'
- 4.2.4 Percept Experientialism Revisited
- 4.3 Perceptual Beliefs and Basic Beliefs
- Chapter 5: Perception, Clairvoyance, and Reliability
- 5.1 Simple Reliabilism and the Norman/Truetemp Objections
- 5.2 Clairvoyance and Basicality
- 5.2.1 Underspecification and the "Clairvoyance Challenge"
- 5.2.2 Perception and Other Cognitive Abilities
- 5.2.3 "Meta-Incoherence"
- 5.3 Reliability and Basicality
- 5.3.1Clairvoyance and Defeat
- 5.3.2 Experientialist Reliabilism
- 5.3.3 Early Reliabilism
- 5.3.4 Teleological Reliabilism
- Chapter 6: Basic Beliefs
- 6.1 The Delineation Problem
- 6.1.1 The Desiderata
- 6.1.2 A Systems Theory of Basicality
- 6.1.3 Counterexamples and Replies
- 6.2 Intuitions and Beyond
- 6.2.1 Descriptive and Normative Epistemology
- 6.2.2 Cognitive Science and Basicality
- 6.2.3 Illustration: Why My Philosophy is More God-Friendly than Plantinga's
- 6.2.4 Reflective Equilibrium and Etiological Constraints
- Chapter 7: Basic and Nonbasic Beliefs in a Reliabilist Epistemology
- 7.1Toward a Theory of Justification
- 7.1.1 Evidential Justification
- 7.1.2 Defeat
- 7.1.3 Outline of a Theory
- 7.2 Internalism and Externalism
- 7.3 The Problem(s) of the External World
- References
- Index
