A provocative critique of corporate governance in the United States that uses the example of defense contracting to challenge the assumptions underlying our current understanding of how and in whose interests corporations should behave.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
* List of Acronyms * Preface * Acknowledgments * Introduction * The Realm of Law * The Case of Defense Adjustment * Making Government Contractors More Accountable * Implications * 1. Crisis of Corporate Governance * The Contractarian Paradigm: Shareholder Primacy in a Nexus of Contracts * Enabling Institutions * Challenging Models and Institutions * The Need for a New Model * 2. Governing Defense Contractors * The Organization of the U.S. Defense Industry * Managing Uncertainty * Multiple Principals, Multiple Goals * Managing Uncertainty by Shifting Risks * Contractors' Fiduciary Obligations to the Public * 3. Adjusting to the Drawdown * The Downturn in Defense Spending * Corporate Responses * The Post-Cold War Regulatory Regime * State Support for Shareholder Primacy * Conclusion * 4. General Dynamics: The Shareholder Success Story of the 1990s * Warning Signs * Shareholder Values * Sticking to Its Knitting * Reorganizing Production at Electric Boat * Conclusion * 5. Redistributing Risks and Rents at General Dynamics * The State and Taxpayers as Risk-Bearers * Employees and Local Governments as Risk-Bearers * Conclusion * 6. Accommodating Public Interests in Corporate Change * Accountability through Popular Participation * Accountability through Contracts and Regulation * Accountability in Practice * Accountability through Corporate Governance Reform * Conclusion * References