Forms and Concepts
is the first comprehensive study of the central role of concepts and concept acquisition in the Platonic tradition. It sets up a stimulating dialogue between Plato s innatist approach and Aristotle s much more empirical response. The primary aim is to analyze and assess the strategies with which Platonists responded to Aristotle s (and Alexander of Aphrodisias ) rival theory. The monograph culminates in a careful reconstruction of the elaborate attempt undertaken by the Neoplatonist Proclus (6th century AD) to devise a systematic Platonic theory of concept acquisition.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
1;A word of thanks;11 2;Introduction;13 2.1;1. How comes the mind to be furnished?;13 2.2;2. Survey of recent literature;17 2.3;3. Structure and contents of this study;21 3;I. Concepts (ancient) problems and solutions;25 3.1;1. What is a concept?;25 3.2;2. The relevance of concepts in ancient epistemological debates;36 3.3;3. Different models of concept acquisition in antiquity;41 3.4;4. Forms and concepts & problematic concepts;47 4;II. Plato on learning as recollection;51 4.1;1. Forms and concepts;51 4.1.1;1.1. The role of concepts in Plato;51 4.1.2;1.2. Forms, concepts, language;53 4.2;2. The Parmenides and the archaeology of conceptualism;57 4.2.1;2.1. Concepts as one over many;57 4.2.2;2.2. Refuting conceptualism?;60 4.2.3;2.3. Conclusion;63 4.3;3. The Meno on the different stages of recollection;64 4.3.1;3.1. The transition from opinion (doxa) to knowledge;64 4.3.2;3.2. Conclusion;68 4.4;4. The Phaedo on the necessity of innate knowledge;69 4.4.1;4.1. The deficiency argument (Phaedo 72e77a);69 4.4.2;4.2. The continuity between Meno and Phaedo;76 4.5;5. The Phaedrus on acquiring universal concepts;77 4.5.1;5.1. Recollection and concept attainment (Phaedrus 249bc);77 4.5.2;5.2. Forms, concepts, language again;82 4.5.3;5.3. Conclusion;83 4.6;6. Concept formation and concepts in the Timaeus, Theaetetus, and Sophist;83 4.6.1;6.1. Recollection in Platos later works;83 4.6.2;6.2. Innateness and the structure of the human soul;85 4.7;7. The limits of recollection;90 4.7.1;7.1. Some problematic concepts;90 4.7.2;7.2. Recollection and error;95 4.8;8. Forms, concepts, and recollection;96 5;III. Aristotles reaction to Plato;99 5.1;1. Aristotle and his teacher Plato;99 5.1.1;1.1. A strange couple;99 5.1.2;1.2. Aristotles arguments against innate knowledge;100 5.2;2. The origin and nature of mathematical concepts;102 5.2.1;2.1. Concepts and the division of sciences;102 5.2.2;2.2. A troublesome emendation;104 5.2.3;2.3. Abstraction and the qua-operator;108 5.2.4;2.4. Aristot
elian and Platonic separation;110 5.2.5;2.5. Mathematical objects and concepts;112 5.2.6;2.6. Linking abstractionM and induction?;120 5.3;3. Universal concepts induction (epagoge) and its different domains;123 5.3.1;3.1. A general definition of induction;124 5.3.2;3.2. Induction and its different domains;125 5.3.3;3.3. The language of induction;126 5.3.4;3.4. Different kinds of induction in Aristotle;128 5.3.4.1;3.4.1. Induction in dialectical and rhetorical practice;128 5.3.4.2;3.4.2. Digression: likeness and the charge of circularity;131 5.3.4.3;3.4.3. Induction in ethics and natural science;133 5.3.4.4;3.4.4. The troublesome case of complete or perfect induction;134 5.3.5;3.5. Induction and the starting points of syllogism;137 5.4;4. Induction of first principles (Posterior Analytics II 19);140 5.4.1;4.1. Introduction;140 5.4.2;4.2. What is the object of Analytica Posteriora II 19?;141 5.4.3;4.3. Articulation and summary of the argument;144 5.4.4;4.4. The relation of sense perception and intellect;146 6;IV. Three case studies: Alcinous, Alexander & Porphyry, and Plotinus;153 6.1;1. Alcinous between empiricism and recollection;153 6.1.1;1.1. The doctrine of the doxastic logos;154 6.1.2;1.2. Alcinous psychology;156 6.1.3;1.3. Empiricism vs. innate knowledge;159 6.2;2. Alexander of Aphrodisias & Porphyry on abstraction and universals;166 6.2.1;2.1. Alexander elaborating Aristotles notion of abstraction;167 6.2.2;2.2. Neoplatonic readings of Alexander;169 6.2.3;2.3. Immanent forms, definitional natures, and universal concepts;173 6.2.4;2.4. A unitary theory of intellect?;176 6.2.5;2.5. Porphyry an abstractionist malgré lui?;183 6.2.6;2.6. The short commentary on Aristotles Categories;184 6.2.7;2.7. The epistemological digression in the commentary on Ptolemy;187 6.3;3. Plotinus Wegbereiter of Syrianus and Proclus;196 6.3.1;3.1. The doctrine of the twofold nature of the logoi (I): logoi as criteria in perceptual judgements;198 6.3.2;3.2. The doctrine of the twofold nat
ure of the logoi (II): logoi as causes in matter;203 6.3.3;3.3. Plotinus on innate knowledge and recollection;207 7;V. Syrianus and Proclus attitude towards Aristotle;217 7.1;1. Amicus Aristoteles, sed;217 7.2;2. Syrianus and Proclus criticism of induction and abstraction;220 7.2.1;2.1. Criticizing abstracted universals;221 7.2.2;2.2. Who is the target of Syrianus and Proclus criticism?;231 8;VI. The crucial role of doxastic concepts in Proclus epistemology;235 8.1;1. Proclus on sense perception and phantasia;237 8.1.1;1.1. Place and character of sense perception;237 8.1.2;1.2. Olympiodorus on the ambiguity of sense perception;239 8.1.3;1.3. Proclus on phantasia;240 8.1.4;1.4. Phantasia and geometry;242 8.1.5;1.5. Resume: sense perception, phantasia, and concept formation;243 8.2;2. An innovation by Proclus: his theory of doxa;244 8.2.1;2.1. Unfair to Proclus? Alleged inconsistencies in his theory of doxa;244 8.2.2;2.2. More recent studies on Proclus theory of doxa;245 8.2.3;2.3. Digression: doxa in Plato and Aristotle;252 8.2.4;2.4. Proclus on doxa and innate knowledge;255 8.2.5;2.5. Proclus on doxastic concepts (logoi doxastikoi);266 8.2.6;2.6. Doxa correcting sense perception;272 9;VII. Proclus Platonic theory of concept attainment;275 9.1;1. The soul and its innate knowledge;276 9.1.1;1.1. The discursive nature of soul: Proclus on dianoia;276 9.1.2;1.2. Dianoia and the logoi of the soul;277 9.1.3;1.3. Sources of Proclus doctrine of the psychic logoi;280 9.1.4;1.4. Common notions and psychic logoi;282 9.2;2. The triad of recollection: forgetting articulation probole;284 9.2.1;2.1. Recollection after Aristotle;284 9.2.2;2.2. Forgetting;286 9.2.3;2.3. Articulation (diarthrosis);290 9.2.3.1;2.3.1. The sources: Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and Middle Platonism;290 9.2.3.2;2.3.2. The Anonymous in Theaetetum (AT);294 9.2.3.3;2.3.3. Articulation: talent and error;296 9.2.3.4;2.3.4. Proclus on articulation;298 9.2.4;2.4. Probole;301 9.2.4.1;2.4.1. Meaning and translatio
n;302 9.2.4.2;2.4.2. Probole and geometry;307 9.2.4.3;2.4.3. Résumé;311 9.3;3. Proclus on learning and the acquisition of concepts;311 9.3.1;3.1. Concept formation and the Platonic dialogue;312 9.3.2;3.2. Recollection as an intentional act of the soul;316 9.3.3;3.3. Different stages of recollection;317 9.3.4;3.4. Different kinds of concepts;321 9.3.5;3.5. A difficult passage;325 9.3.6;3.6. Recollection and error;329 9.3.7;3.7. Problematic concepts;337 10;VIII. Plato and Aristotle in harmony? Some conclusions;347 11;Bibliography;355 11.1;1. Editions and translations;355 11.2;2. Secondary literature;367 12;Indices;393 12.1;1. Index nominum;393 12.2;2. Index locorum;395 12.3;3. Index rerum;402