This essay proposes that Hume's non-substantialist bundle account of minds is basically correct. The concept of a person is not a metaphysical notion but a forensic one, that of a being who enters into the moral and normative relations of civil society. A person is a bundle but it is also a structured bundle. Hume's metaphysics of relations is argued must be replaced by a more adequate one such as that of Russell, but beyond that Hume's account is essentially correct. In particular it is argued that it is one's character that constitutes one's identity; and that sympathy and the passions of pride and humility are central in forming and maintaining one's character and one's identity as a person. But also central is one's body: a person is an embodied consciousness: the notion that one's body is essential to one's identity is defended at length. Various concepts of mind and consciousness are examined - for example, neutral monism and intentionality - and also the concept of privacy and our inferences to other minds.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
1;Acknowledgments;6 2;Note;7 3;Table of Contents;9 4;Introduction;13 5;Chapter OneSelf as Substance;29 5.1;(1) The Substance Tradition1;29 5.2;(2) The Metaphysics of Morals;38 5.3;(3) Morality and the Substantial Self Untied;45 5.4;(4) Human Nature Defended;54 5.5;(5) George Grant: Aristotelian Moral Philosophy Made Modern;81 5.6;(6) Another Sort of Mind;98 5.7;(7) Minds as Bundles;106 5.8;Endnotes to Chapter One;108 6;Chapter TwoNominalism and Acquaintance;115 6.1;(1) Individuation and Nominalism;118 6.2;(2) The Principle of Acquaintance in Locke and Hume;120 6.3;(3) The Appeal to Acquaintance: Empiricism vs. Descartes;133 6.4;(4) Humes Nominalism;137 6.5;(5) Nominalism and Relations;142 6.6;(6) Nominalism, Causation, Substances and Things;151 6.7;Endnotes to Chapter Two;194 7;Chapter ThreeFrom the Substance Tradition through Locketo Hume:Ordinary Things and Critical Realism;203 7.1;(1) Up to Locke;203 7.2;(2) From Locke to Hume9;208 7.3;(3) Humes Causal Inference to Critical Realism;226 7.4;(4) The System of the Vulgar as False, Inevitable and Reasonable;236 7.5;(5) The World of the Philosophers;244 7.6;(6) Conclusion;253 7.7;Endnotes to Chapter Three;258 8;The Disappearance of the Simple Self: ItsProblems;263 8.1;(1) Substance and Self in Locke1;263 8.2;(2) The Contents of the Humean Mind;270 8.3;(3) Explaining Consciousness;295 8.4;(4) Privacy and Other Minds;324 8.5;(5) The Problem of the Self in Hume;365 8.6;Endnotes to Chapter Four;373 9;Chapter FiveHumes Positive Account of the Self;387 9.1;(1) Mind and Body;387 9.2;(2) The Bodily Criterion;407 9.3;(3) Humean Persons;415 9.4;(4) Becoming Our Selves;483 9.5;(5) Conclusion The Final One;500 9.6;Endnotes to Chapter Five;510 10;Bibliography;519